CAB Regulation of Airline Reservation Oversales: An Analysis of Economic Regulation 1050 by Sherman, Gregory S.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 4
1979
CAB Regulation of Airline Reservation Oversales:
An Analysis of Economic Regulation 1050
Gregory S. Sherman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation






AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION 1050
GREGORY S. SHERMAN
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requires the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) to regulate the airline industry in a manner that
is consistent with the general public interest Adherence to this
statutory mandate compels the CAB to promote the often conflict-
ing interests of air travelers and the airline industry. This is readily
apparent in the context of the problem of oversales. On the one
hand, airlines seek to reduce reservation costs and to maximize
passenger utilization of flight capacity to maintain their financial
stability. On the other hand, air travelers demand reasonable fares,
' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1302
(1976), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 602, 52 Stat. 973. The Act
provides:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under
this chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other
things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with public
convenience and necessity:(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transporta-
tion system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the United
States Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the high-
est degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in,
such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and co-
ordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient serv-
ice by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discrimi-
nations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound de-
velopment of air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States,
of the United States Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics.
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flexibility in making reservations, and assurance that their con-
firmed reservations will be honored. A solution to the oversales
problem requires a regulatory policy that strikes a balance between
these conflicting interests.' Economic Regulation 1050 (ER-1050)
is the latest attempt by the CAB to construct such a regulatory
policy.'
This comment examines the causes of oversales and past actions
taken by the CAB and the public in response to the problem. Also,
ER-1050 is reviewed and its effect on judicial remedies is analyzed.
Finally, this comment offers an evaluation of the effectiveness of
ER-1050 as a regulatory solution to the oversales problem.
THE NATURE OF THE OVERSALES PROBLEM
An oversale occurs when the number of persons with confirmed
reservations appearing to board a flight exceeds the number of
seats available, thus necessitating a denial of boarding or "bump-
ing" of one or more passengers.4 The number of persons bumped as
a result of oversales is small as compared with the total number
of persons transported.' For example, 6.6 persons were bumped for
every 10,000 passengers enplaned in domestic operations in fiscal
year 1977. The airline industry's rate of oversales, however, has
2 The regulatory power of the CAB is delineated at 49 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976).
Section 204 of the Act provides:
(a) The Board is empowered to perform such acts, to conduct
such investigations, to issue and amend such orders, and to make...
rules, regulations, and procedure, pursuant to and consistent with
the provisions of . . . and to exercise and perform its powers
and duties under, this chapter.
For a discusison of the statutory framework which prescribes the powers and
duties of the CAB see Russell, The CAB and the Consumer, 40 J. Ant L. & COM.
51 (1974).
3ER-1050 appears at 43 Fed. Reg. 24,283-85 (1978) (to be codified in 14
C.F.R. § 250). It became effective on September 3, 1978 [hereinafter cited as
CAB ER-1050].
4 Reexamination of the Board's Policies Concerning Deliberate Overbooking
and Oversales: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CAB Docket No. 29139, EDR-
334, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,578 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CAB EDR-334].
I Id. at 48,582.
6Part 250-Oversales: Comprehensive Amendment, CAB Docket No. 29,139,
ER-1050, 43 Fed. Reg. 24,277, 24,281 (1978). United States flag carriers denied
boarding to 7.8 passengers per 10,000 enplanements on international flights. Id.
The CAB made comments contemporaneous to its promulgation of ER-1050,
supra note 3. These comments are found at 43 Fed. Reg. 24,277-83 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as CAB Comments on ER-1050].
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been increasing in recent years.! The absolute number of persons
bumped as a result of oversales rose to 150,000 in fiscal year
1977.8
Oversales result from a variety of causes.9 Airline personnel and
travel agents may make errors in recording reservations. A com-
puter malfunction in an airline reservation system may produce
similar errors. 0 Reservation practices such as "free sale" or "block
ticketing" arrangements may also cause an oversale. "Block ticket-
ing" programs give travel agents or passengers ticket stock which
each uses to issue confirmed reservations without notifying the
carrier. "Free sale" is a procedure established by intercarrier agree-
ment whereby a participating carrier may confirm reservations of
another carrier without checking available space up to a specified
time before departure.' The aforementioned causes of oversales
produce "no record" passengers. These are passengers who appear
at the boarding gate with a validated ticket when the carrier has
no record of a reservation. Other carrier practices, such as last
minute substitution of lower capacity aircraft for operational or
safety reasons, cause oversales despite the existence of a record of
a reservation having been made. 1
The cause of oversales that has attracted the most attention from
the CAB and the public is overbooking. 3 Overbooking is a carrier's
intentional acceptance prior to flight time of a number of reserva-
tions for a specific flight in excess of the number of seats available
on the aircraft.' A carrier utilizes this procedure when statistical
analysis of a flight's reservation history indicates that an appreci-
7 Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation Tariffs and Reports of Un-
accommodated Passengers: Reexamination of the Board's Policies Concerning
Overbooking and Oversales, CAB Docket No. 29,139, EDR-296, 41 Fed. Reg.
16,478 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CAB EDR-296].
O CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,278.




13 According to the CAB, overbooking is the reservation practice most re-
sponsible for the CAB's adoption of regulations in 1967 requiring airlines to pay
compensation to passengers bumped because of an oversale. CAB EDR-296,
supra note 7, at 16,478. These regulations are discussed in text accompanying
notes 27-37 infra.
14 CAB EDR-334, supra note 4, at 48,578.
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able level of "no shows" or "reservation turnover" should be an-
ticipated.' Passengers with reservations who fail to appear at
departure time or to cancel their reservations are designated "no
shows," while "reservation turnover" signifies the number of reser-
vation cancellations that occur shortly before a flight's departure."
Thus overbooking is a means by which an airline can help assure
that each flight departs with as few empty seats as possible." While
all carriers engage in the practice of overbooking,5 the great ma-
jority of flights are not overbooked."' Moreover, a CAB investiga-
tion found no substantial abuse of overbooking by the airline
industry in recent years."
PRIOR EFFORTS OF THE CAB TO MINIMIZE THE
OVERSALES PROBLEM
The CAB did little to scrutinize airline reservation practices
that cause oversales until 1960.21 At that time the CAB instituted
a major investigation into the overbooking practices of trunkline
carriers.' In 1962 the CAB approved a voluntary agreement
1 Comments of Ozark Airlines, Inc., on CAB EDR-334, supra note 4, sub-
mitted to the CAB on November 11, 1977. These comments are on file with the
CAB in Washington, D.C. [hereinafter cited as Ozark's Comments].16 Id. The problems of "no shows" and "reservation turnover" are heightened
by those passengers who, for their own convenience, make multiple reservations
with the intent of honoring only one. Id. In 1973, industry statistics showed that
the number of "no shows" per flight was 24.7%. Comment, Federal Preemption
of State Law: The Example of Overbooking in the Airline Industry, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1200, 1201 (1976).
17 Brief for Certain Members of the Air Transport Association of America
as Amicus Curiae at 3, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 14 Av. Cas. 18,312
(D.D.C. 1978).
1" Emergency Reservations Practices Investigation, CAB Docket No. 26,253,
Initial Decision by Robert L. Park, Associate Chief Administrative Law Judge,
at 10 (June 10, 1974) [hereinafter cited as CAB ERPI].
19Id. at 39.
20 Id. For a detailed discussion of airline overbooking practices see S. Tice,
Overbooking of Airline Reservations in View of "Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
Inc.": The Opening of Pandora's Box, 43 J. Am L. & CoM. 1 (1977).
21 CAB EDR-334, supra note 4, at 48,578.
" Overbooking Practices of Trunkline Carriers Investigation, CAB Order
E-15615 (1960). The CAB had previously begun an enforcement proceeding
against National Airlines to determine whether its overbooking practices were de-
ceptive, National Airlines, Inc. Enforcement Proceeding, 31 CAB 390 (1960).
The CAB later terminated this proceeding after concluding that an enforcement
case against one carrier was too limited in scope to decide the issue of overbook-
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among eleven trunkline carriers, which inter alia provided for pay-
ment of compensation to certain classes of persons who were
bumped because of oversales.' Two years later the CAB deferred
its investigation of overbooking by trunkline carriers.' In 1965
the CAB initiated a rulemaking proceeding directed specifically at
the problem of oversales.5 This proceeding ended in 1967 with
the promulgation of the first regulations which attempted to grapple
with the industry-wide problem of oversales.N
The 1967 regulations required all carriers to pay a fixed rate
of compensation to persons who were bumped as a result of over-
sales."' Minimum and maximum levels of payment were specified,
and exceptions, to carrier liability to make such payments were
established. 8 The rules also required carriers to formulate non-
discriminatory boarding priority rules for determining which pas-
sengers should be denied boarding in the event of an oversale."
ing. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Air Transport Association at 17, Nader v. Alle-
gheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A.T.A. Brief].
2 CAB Order E-18064, 35 CAB 881 (March 1, 1962). The amount of denied
boarding compensation was based upon the value of the first remaining flight cou-
pon, with a maximum award of $40. The average payment was $20 per passen-
ger. There were various exceptions to eligibility for compensation. No compen-
sation was awarded a passenger denied boarding (1) because of equipment sub-
stitutions, etc., (2) when the carrier provided alternative transportation arriving
within one hour of the previously planned arrival time, and (3) when the passen-
ger was downgraded or upgraded on the same flight. Id.
2 CAB Order E-20859 (May 25, 1964).
2 Passenger Priorities and Overbooked Flights: Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, EDR-95, 30 Fed. Reg. 13,236 (1965).
" Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation Tariffs and Reports of Un-
accommodated Passengers, ER-503, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,939 (1967) (codified as 14
C.F.R. § 250). Despite subsequent amendments, these regulations remained sub-
stantially unchanged until the promulgation of ER-1050 in 1978. A.T.A. Brief,
supra note 22, at Appendix 10a; Ozark's Comments, supra note 15. ER-1050 is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 54-86 infra.
2 7 An eligible passenger was paid 100% of the value of the first remaining
flight coupon. 14 C.F.R. S 250.5 (1978). Acceptance of denied boarding com-
pensation constituted liquidated damages and relieved the carrier of all liability
for failure to provide the passenger confirmed reservation space. 14 C.F.R. 5
250.7 (1978).
28 The regulation specified a minimum payment of $25 and a maximum pay-
ment of $200. 14 C.F.R. § 250.5 (1978). A passenger was ineligible for com-
pensation if he was denied his reserved space (1) because the government had
requisitioned the space, (2) when substitution of aircraft was necessary for opera-
tional or safety reasons, or (3) when he accepted alternate transportation which
was scheduled to arrive within two hours of his original arrival time or four hours
in the case of foreign transportation. 14 C.F.R. § 250.6 (1978).
14 C.F.R. § 250.3( 1978).
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The policy underlying the 1967 regulations was to minimize the
effects of oversales without regulating those reservation practices
which cause oversales. This policy is clearly reflected in comments
made by the CAB during the rulemaking proceeding.' ° For ex-
ample, the CAB acknowledged that "block ticketing" and "free
sale" arrangements not only cause but invite oversales. It declined,
however, to interfere with these two practices because they reduce
carrier reservation costs and facilitate the purchase of reserved
seating.'
Concerning overbooking, the CAB stated that, even though
overbooking is a cause of oversales, the practice enables the carrier
to compensate for reduced load factors occasioned by "no shows"
and "reservation turnover."' Thus, overbooking keeps fares lower,
enables airlines to accommodate more passengers, and permits cus-
tomers to make and break reservations freely. For these reasons
the CAB concluded that regulation of overbooking would be un-
advisable.'
This policy was reaffirmed in 1974 in the CAB's Emergency
Reservation Practices Investigation (ERPI).' Through the ERPI
the CAB considered the advisability of imposing controls on the
reservation practices of carriers during an anticipated national fuel
shortage. The objective of such controls is to maximize the utiliza-
tion of aircraft capacity.' Ticketing time limits and refund penal-
ties were two controls considered as means of reducing "no shows"
and "reservation turnover," both of which lower load factors on
flights.' Through the ERPI the CAB concluded that any regula-
tion of reservation practices should be imposed only in a national
"oPriority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation Tarifis and Reports of Un-
accommodated Passengers: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CAB Docket No.
16563, EDR-109, 32 Fed. Reg. 459, 461 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CAB EDR-
109].
1 Id. at 461.
32 Id.
SId.
CAB ERPI, supra note 18.
's Emergency Reservation Practices Investigation: Order Instituting Investiga-
tion; Tentative Findings and Conclusions; and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
CAB Docket No. 26253, Order No. 73-12-93, EDR-260, 39 Fed. Reg. 823 (1974).
The investigation was ordered on December 21, 1973. Id. An intial decision was
reached in 1974. CAB ERPI, supra note 18.
3 CAB ERPI, supra note 18.
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emergency and that the existing reservation system generally
benefited the traveling public.'
Thus at that time the CAB viewed oversales as an unavoidable
by-product of a reservation system that preserves maximum flexi-
bility in making and altering confirmed reservations. Regulation
directed toward eliminating the causes of oversales would jeopard-
ize this flexibility.' Despite various amendments these regulations
remained substantially the same until the promulgation of ER-1050
in 1978."
JUDICIAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE BUMPED PASSENGER
Acceptance of compensation provided in CAB regulations by
a passenger bumped due to an oversale relieves the carrier from
any further legal liability for failing to honor that passenger's con-
firmed reservation. ' Often bumped passengers have rejected this
regulatory remedy and used judicial process to recover compen-
satory and sometimes punitive damages.' For bumped passengers
rejecting the compensation mandated by the CAB, two bases for
judicial relief have been available, one statutory and one premised
on common law.
A. Statutory Remedy
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Act) does not prescribe
private remedies for violations of its provisions. ' Federal courts,
however, have long recognized an implied private remedy under
Section 404(b) of the Act.' A judicially cognizable claim arises
37 Id. at 6. The CAB affirmed Judge Park's Initial Decision and terminated
the investigation in 1976. EDR-334, supra note 4, at 48,579.
"1 CAB EDR-109, supra note 30, at 461.
"a Ozark's Comments, supra note 15. A.T.A. Brief, supra note 22, at Appendix
10a.
40 14 C.F.R. § 250.7 (1977).
41 See Campbell, Airlines' Responsibilities to Passengers: Recent Theories and
Extensions, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 289, 292 (1977).
Id. at 294.
"49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1976):
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, part, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation
in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port
locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust
19791
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when an airline unjustly discriminates against any person seeking
air transportation. In the context of oversales, an airline violates
this statutory provision when it denies boarding to a passenger
because it has failed to follow its boarding priority rules. Such
rules are criteria established by each carrier for determining which
passenger holding confirmed reservations will be denied boarding
on an oversold flight." This statutory remedy is based on tort
rather than contract principles and provides the basis for an award
of compensatory damages. ' No court has implied a statutory
remedy in favor of nonpassengers."
Some federal courts have awarded punitive damages to passen-
gers for violation of Section 404(b)." The awarding of punitive
damages is significant in these cases because the actual damages
borne by a passenger typically do not warrant the expense of insti-
gating legal action.' Punitive damages are recoverable if there is
evidence of intentional wrongdoing or conscious disregard for
the passenger's rights, such as willful disregard of priority rules or
discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disad-
vantage in any respect whatsoever.
Archibald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972);
Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956);
Kaplan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 12 Av. Cas. 17,933 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Mor-
timer v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. 111. 1969); Wills v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
"See Comment, Discriminatory Bumping, 40 J. Am L . & CoM. 533 (1974);
Campbell, Airlines' Responsibilities to Passengers: Recent Theories and Exten-
sions, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 289, 294-97 (1977). Many courts have held that vio-
lations of boarding priority rules constitute statutory discrimination within the
meaning of Section 404(b). S. Tice, Overbooking of Airline Reservations in
View of "Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.": The Opening of Pandora's Box,
43 J. Am L. & CoM. 1, 13 n.62 (1977).
4The basis of the statutory cause of action is not breach of contract of car-
riage. Denied boarding compensation mandated by the CAB is the remedy for
such breach. The remedy is pursued as a tort cause of action for discrimination
evidenced by violation of boarding priority rules. Mortimer v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
302 F. Supp. 276, 281 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Until denied compensation was made
mandatory by the CAB in 1967, passengers were awarded compensatory damages,
but there was some confusion as to the theory of recovery utilized. 34 J. Am
L. & COM. 127, 129 (1968).
"See Campbell, Airlines' Responsibilities to Passengers: Recent Theories and
Extensions, 43 J. Am L. & COM. 289, 301-303 (1977).
" Smith v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Tex. 1976), modi-
fied, 567 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1978); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F.
Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
"See Comment, Discriminatory Bumping, 40 J. Am L. & CoM. 533, 536
(1974).
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discourteous treatment of a passenger who is wrongfully denied
boarding." Early decisions held that the reservation practice of
overbooking constituted malicious, willful, or wanton conduct suffi-
cient to justify an award of punitive damages." Subsequent deci-
sions, however, have indicated that overbooking per se does not
justify the imposition of punitive damages, but substantial over-
sales is evidence of malice to be considered in awarding punitive
damages. 1
In order to establish his cause of action, a passenger must show
that he complied with the carrier's check-in and reservation con-
firmation requirements, and that the airline failed to honor the
confirmed reservation. Once the passenger's prima facie case is
thus established, the burden of proof shifts to the airline to demon-
strate that it complied with its boarding priority rules.' The
plaintiff also must demonstrate that a carrier's violation of its
boarding priority rules proximately caused his damages. Thus a
passenger must show that he would have been able to board the
flight but for the airline's disregard of his particular boarding
priority."
B. Common Law Remedy
In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., the Supreme Court held
that airlines are not immune from common law tort liability to
passengers with confirmed reservations who are bumped as a result
"Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 549-50 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976), remanded, 14 Av. Cas. 18,312
(D.D.C. 1978); Smith v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 641, 643 (N.D.
Tex. 1976), modified, 567 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1978); Campbell, Airlines' Re-
sponsibilities to Passengers: Recent Theories and Extensions, 43 J. AIR L. &
COM. 289, 304-406 (1977).
"Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 367-368 (S.D. Cal.
1961).
-I Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976), remanded, 14 Av. Cas. 18,312
(D.D.C. 1978); Archibald v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14, 16
(9th Cir. 1972); Kaplan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 12 Av. Cas. 17,933,
17,935 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
"Campbell, Airlines' Responsibilities to Passengers: Recent Theories and
Extensions, 43 J. ArR L. & CoM. 289, 295-96 (1977).
"Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976), remanded, 14 Av. Cas. 18,312
(D.D.C. 1978).
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of oversales.' Thus a bumped passenger may pursue any available
common law remedy, even if the airline has not violated its board-
ing priority rules. As a practical matter, the decision by the
Supreme Court in Nader enabled bumped passengers to sue in
tort for misrepresentation."
If a carrier affirmatively represented that a seat was guaranteed
a passenger holding a confirmed reservation, and he was subse-
quently bumped, a case of misrepresentation would be relatively
easy to establish. In perhaps all but a handful of cases, however,
the carriers would make no such representation. The passenger
would then be forced to contend that he reasonably believed that
a confirmed reservation precluded the possibility of his being
bumped and that the carrier had breached a duty to disclose that
its reservation practices, such as overbooking, could result in an
oversale. This latter contention was made in Nader, and the dis-
trict court on remand found that a duty of disclosure did exist
and was breached by the carrier, justifying the imposition of com-
pensatory and punitive damages for misrepresentation."0
ECONOMIC REGULATION 1050
A developing industry-wide trend toward a higher rate of over-
sales, growing numbers of consumer complaints about CAB regula-
tion, and an increasing number of lawsuits instituted against car-
riers by bumped passengers persuaded the CAB to initiate a
reexamination of its policy regarding oversales This two-year
reexamination culminated in the promulgation of Economic
-426 U.S. 290, 305 (1976). The disposition of this case by various federal
courts has raised many interesting and complex issues that are beyond the scope
of this comment. For a thorough discussion, see generally 42 J. Am L. & COM.
881 (1976); Campbell, Airlines' Responsibilities to Passengers: Recent Theories
and Extensions, 43 J. AIR L. & CoM. 289 (1977); S. Tice, Overbooking of Air-
line Reservations in View of "Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.": The Opening
of Pandora's Box, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 1 (1977); Comment, Federal Preemption
of State Law: The Example of Overbooking in the Airline Industry, 74 MIcH. L.
REv. 1200 (1976).
55 Campbell, Airlines Responsibilities to Passengers: Recent Theories and Ex-
tensions, 43 J. AiR L. & COM. 289, 300 (1977).
5Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 14 Av. Cas. 18,312, 18,316 (D.D.C.
1978).
57CAB EDR-296, supra note 7.
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Regulation 1050 in 1978." ER-1050 has changed existing regula-
tions regarding oversales in the following respects:
A. Denied Boarding Compensation Increased
The percentage rate of compensation available to a bumped
passenger has been raised from 100 percent to 200 percent of
ticket value. The minimum and maximum levels of payment have
been increased to $75 and $400 from $25 and $200, respectively."
The definition of ticket value, moreover, has been expanded be-
yond the value of the first remaining coupon to include all re-
maining flight coupons up to a passenger's next stopover, if four
hours or longer, or his destination. United States transportation
taxes are included in this new definition of ticket value.'
ER-1050 eliminates a major exception to a passenger's eligi-
bility for denied boarding compensation. Under the 1967 regula-
tions, a passenger was ineligible for compensation if a carrier
provided him with alternative transportation that arrived at his
next stopover or destination within two hours of his originally
scheduled arrival time, or four hours in the case of foreign air
transportation."' The CAB estimates that over fifty percent of all
bumped passengers were ineligible for any compensation because
of this alternative transportation exception in the superseded regu-
lation." These passengers are now eligible for one-half of the com-
pensation otherwise payable.' The CAB justified these changes
by concluding that the amounts and availability of compensation
were inadequate and that increased compensation to bumped pas-
sengers would create an additional economic incentive for carriers
to reduce oversales."
B. Solicitation of Volunteers Required
Under ER-1050, carriers are required to seek persons who will
volunteer to relinquish their confirmed reservations before any
51 CAB ER-1050, supra note 3.
59 CAB ER-1050, supra note 3, at 24,283 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. S
250.5).
0Id.
6 14 C.F.R. § 250.6(b) (1978).
62 CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,280.
"CAB ER-1050, supra note 3, at 24,283 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. §
250.5).
"CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,280.
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passenger may be bumped against his will." The objective of this
requirement is to reduce "involuntary" bumping to the smallest
practicable level in the event an oversale cannot be avoided."
The CAB declined to prescribe a method for soliciting volunteers;
rather, carriers were encouraged to experiment in finding the
most effecitve methods.
While the CAB has required carriers to pay a significantly
higher rate of denied boarding compensation to passengers bumped
involuntarily, it refrained from specifying the level of compensa-
tion payable to volunteers. This determination was left to the
discretion of each carrier because of disagreement over the amount
or type of compensation that would be sufficient to attract volun-
teers. 8 One carrier argued that compensation much lower than
that prescribed for nonvolunteers would be sufficient to attract
enough volunteers to eliminate involuntary bumping almost en-
tirely." It further argued that compensation for volunteers must
be significantly lower than that offered to nonvolunteers if carriers
were to have an economic incentive to make a genuine effort to
solicit volunteers." Several other carriers took the opposite posi-
tion, arguing that compensation for volunteers should be higher
than that for nonvolunteers. They contended that passengers would
not volunteer if they learned that compensation was higher for
those passengers bumped involuntarily. 1 The CAB conceded the
possibility that, once passengers became familiar with the alterna-
tive amounts of compensation available, carriers might be forced
" CAB ER-1050, supra note 3, at 24,283 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. S
250.2b).
"CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,278.
67 Id. at 24,279.
68 Id. It appears that the CAB was greatly influenced by the comments of
American Airlines in reaching this decision.
6 American Airlines submitted studies indicating that volunteers might be
readily obtained by offering persons relatively small sums of money. Comments
of American Airlines, Inc., upon CAB EDR-334, submitted to the CAB on No-
vember 17, 1977. These comments are on file with the CAB in Washington, D.C.
[hereinafter cited as American's Comments].
70 Id.
"'Comments of Delta Airlines, Inc., on CAB EDR-334, submitted to the
CAB on November 21, 1977 [hereinafter cited as Delta's Comments]; Comments
of Eastern Airlines, Inc., on CAB EDR-334, submitted to the CAB on November
21, 1977 [hereinafter cited as Eastern's Comments]. These comments are on file
with the CAB in Washington, D.C.
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to offer greater compensation to volunteers to implement the pro-
gram effectively. '
Although the CAB declined to prescribe a method for soliciting
volunteers, it did require each carrier to give more information to
passengers of a certain status when it attempted to execute its
volunteer solicitation program."3 If a passenger is in danger of
being bumped involuntarily, the carrier must inform him of the
compensation available to both passengers bumped involuntarily
and passengers bumped voluntarily. Unless such passenger is fully
informed, he may not be involuntarily bumped. If a passenger is
not in danger of being bumped involuntarily, the carrier may re-
quest that he volunteer without informing him of compensation
available to those who are involuntarily bumped."4 Carriers can
distinguish those passengers in danger of being bumped only by
reference to their boarding priority rules. The method of soliciting
volunteers selected by any carrier is therefore directly related to
the character of the boarding priority rules it has adopted.
C. Boarding Priority Rules Publicized
Under regulations superceded by ER-1050, carriers were re-
quired to file with the CAB nondiscriminatory boarding priority
rules to be used by the carrier to determine which passengers hold-
ing confirmed reservations would be denied boarding on an over-
sold flight." The CAB, however, concluded that these rules were
insufficiently publicized and often so broadly drafted that they
invited arbitrary action by airline personnel." ER-1050, as adopted
on May 30, 1978, requires boarding priority rules to be written
in a clear and specific manner so that the average passenger
can ascertain the approximate likelihood of his being bumped."




72 14 C.F.R. § 250.3 (1978).
7 CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,281; Comments of the
Aviation Consumer Action Project upon CAB EDR-334. These comments were
submitted to the CAB on November 22, 1977, and are on file with the CAB in
Washington, D.C. [hereinafter cited as ACAP's Comments on CAB EDR-334].
For example, some boarding priority rules allowed carrier personnel to bump "the
most logical passenger" or "the least inconvenienced passenger." CAB Comments
on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,281.
77CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,281; CAB ER-1050,
supra note 3, at 24,283 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. S 250.3).
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To insure that this standard is met, ER-1050 requires boarding
priority rules to be filed as tariffs so that the CAB and the public
will have an opportunity to evaluate them." In addition, airlines
are required to make copies of their boarding priority rules avail-
able at ticket counters and boarding points" and to make reference
to their availability in notices posted at ticket counters and en-
closed within ticket coupons."
Prior to September 3, 1978, the effective date of ER-1050,
most carriers had attempted to comply with the new regulations
by filing their proposed boarding priority rules as tariffs. The CAB,
however, rejected the two types of boarding priority rules most
frequently submitted in an order issued on August 17, 1978."
Proposed rules which gave priority to passengers in a higher fare
category were suspended. The CAB stated that such rules would
be valid only if specific notice of boarding priority rules was given
to lower fare passengers. The CAB also suspended all proposed
rules determining boarding priority on a first-come, first-serve basis.
These rules were suspended because they were ambiguous and in-
consistent with actual check-in procedures. For example, some
carriers specified the departure area as the location at which to
establish priority instead of the locations where tickets or boarding
passes are issued. Other boarding priority rules were unclear or
failed entirely to specify where a passenger must present himself
to establish priority."
Another reason for suspension of proposed tariffs concerning
boarding priority rules was the CAB's concern about check-in
procedures and how they affected a passenger's eligibility for in-
creased levels of compensation payable under ER-1050. ER-1050,
as adopted on May 30, 1978, did not require that check-in pro-
cedures be included in the tariffs concerning boarding priority
rules or that notice of such procedures be given to passengers.
Check-in requirements established by each carrier, however, must
be met by a passenger regardless of his carrier's boarding priority
78 CAB ER-1050, supra note 3, at 24,283 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. S 250.3).
" CAB ER-1050, supra note 3, at 24,284 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 250.9).
so CAB ER-1050, supra note 3, at 24,284 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. S
250.11).
81 CAB Order No. 78-8-98 (August 17, 1978).
"8 Id.
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rules if he is to confirm his reservation and be eligible for denied
boarding compensation in the event he is bumped involuntarily.'
The order of August 17 was followed by an order issued on
September 1, 1978, which temporarily waived the requirement
imposed by ER-1050 that boarding priority rules be filed as tariffs."
In this order, the CAB made clear its concern that passengers be
fully informed about boarding priority rules and check-in time
limits and procedures. It stated, however, that any further action
required of carriers pertaining to these issues would be specified
in a subsequent order." Such an order was issued on February 15,
1979.6
D. Public Disclosure of Information Related to the Oversale Prob-
lem Required
In March of 1977 the CAB adopted on an interim basis a rule
requiring all carriers to give actual notice of their overbooking
practices." Those notice requirements were substantially incor-
porated into ER-1050." Carriers are now required to post signs
at their ticket offices and include printed messages in their ticket
envelopes which contain a statement of notice approved by the
CAB." This statement alerts the passenger to the carrier's deliber-
ate overbooking practices and to the possibility that his flight may
be oversold. It advises the passenger that the carrier must seek
volunteers before involuntarily bumping any passenger and that
the carrier must adhere to its boarding priority rules in determin-
83 Id.
"CAB Order No. 78-9-6 (September 1, 1978).
8 Id.
81 CAB Order No. 79-2-105 (February 15, 1979). The CAB's waiver of the
requirement of ER-1050 that boarding priority rules be filed as tariffs was re-
voked effective May 2, 1979. Carriers are required to give special notice to
passengers of boarding priority rules which are not on a first-come, first-served
basis. ER-1050 did not specifically deal with check-in procedures; the agency de-
clined to require specific notice of check-in procedures to passengers. The CAB,
however, strongly encouraged carriers to voluntarily give such notice in order to
obviate rulemaking and enforcement action concerning this issue in the future.
87 Construction, Publication, Filing and Posting of Tariffs of Carriers and
Foreign Air Carriers: Reexamination of the Board's Policies Concerning Delib-
erate Overbooking and Oversales, CAB Docket No. 29,776, ER-987, 42 Fed. Reg.
12,420 (1977).
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ing who will be bumped involuntarily. Finally, it informs passen-
gers that copies of the carrier's boarding priority rules and CAB
rules regarding denied boarding compensation are available at
the carrier's ticket counters and boarding locations."
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION 1050 UPON
JUDICIAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE BUMPED PASSENGER
A. Statutory Remedy
The requirement of ER-1050 that boarding priority rules be
written in a clear and specific manner will facilitate the establish-
ment of the statutory claim under Section 404(b) of the Act.
Many ambiguous boarding priority rules gave carriers almost un-
bridled discretion to select a passenger to be bumped and made it
virtually impossible for an aggrieved passenger to verify that a
carrier had acted in violation of its stated priorities. The standard
of clarity imposed by ER-1050 should supply passengers with
fixed criteria against which to measure the conduct of the airlines
during the boarding process. The CAB's order of August 17,
1978, suspending many carriers' boarding priority rules indicates
that the new standard will be enforced. Public dissemination of
airlines' boarding priority rules will increase passengers' aware-
ness of their rights and may encourage bumped passengers to
utilize judicial remedies. Moreover, the threat of lawsuits based
upon the statutory claim, combined with more intense CAB and
public scrutiny of the rules, will induce carriers to adhere more
strictly to the boarding priority rules they have adopted.
B. Common Law Remedy
ER-1050 requires each carrier to give its passengers actual
notice of its practice of overbooking and of the possibility that a
passenger with a confirmed reservation may be bumped because
of an oversale. If an airline, presumably by mistake, affirmatively
represents that a confirmed reservation guarantees passage on a
particular flight, it would be extremely difficult for a bumped pas-
senger to argue that he reasonably relied upon such a representa-
tion when he had received actual notice to the contrary. In the
absence of an affirmative misrepresentation, the Nader case states
90 Id.
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that liability may be imposed for breach of a duty to disclose that
airline reservation practices could result in the bumping of pas-
sengers with confirmed reservations."' The requirement of ER-1050
that actual notice of such facts be given each passenger directly
precludes a claim on these grounds. Therefore, a common law
claim of msirepresentation appears untenable if each carrier com-
plies with the requirements of the new regulations.
EVALUATION OF ER-1050 AS AN EFFECTIVE
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE OVERSALES PROBLEM
ER- 1050 reflects a significant change in the CAB's policy regard-
ing oversales. The goal of the 1967 regulations was remedial. The
CAB sought only to compensate the bumped passenger." Oversales
were viewed as an unavoidable by-product of a flexible reservation
system that should be maintained. Consequently, any regulation
which might interfere with carriers' control over their reservation
practices was purposely avoided." In contrast, the goal of ER-1050
is prophylactic. It seeks to create economic incentives of sufficient
magnitude to compel carriers to control the causes of oversales."
ER-1050 and action taken by the CAB subsequent to its adoption,
moreover, clearly indicate that the CAB is determined to reduce
involuntary bumping to the lowest practicable level, even if effec-
tive regulation compromises the existing flexible reservation system.
Ample evidence exists to support this conclusion. For example,
in 1967 the CAB withdrew a proposed requirement that carriers
notify passengers of their overbooked status prior to flight time.
The CAB withdrew this proposal because such a requirement
would constitute de facto regulation of the reservation practice of
overbooking." At that time the CAB endorsed overbooking as a
beneficial practice because it was regarded as an integral com-
ponent of a flexible reservation system." The CAB's change in
policy is deflected in ER-1050's requirement of strict public dis-
O'Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 14 Av. Cas. 18,312 (D.D.C. 1978).
"CAB EDR-109, supra note 30, at 461.
93 Id.
"CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,280.
0CAB EDR-109, supra note 30, at 461.
9Id.
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closure of overbooking practices."' In its comments accompanying
the promulgation of ER-1050, the CAB reserved the option of
declaring overbooking illegal unless the oversales it occasions are
reduced substantially below current levels."'
Change in policy is also evidenced by recent actions of the CAB
regarding boarding priority rules. Under superseded regulations
carriers were given almost complete discretion to formulate board-
ing priority rules. These rules were broadly drafted to give the air-
lines great flexibility in determining which passenger would be
denied boarding on an oversold flight. Public disclosure of these
rules was not contemplated." In contrast, comments by the CAB
accompanying the promulgation of ER-1050 and orders issued sub-
sequent to the adoption of the new regulations indicate that board-
ing priority rules filed as tariffs must meet the strict standards of
ER-1050 if they are to be approved by the CAB."' It is also rea-
sonable to conclude that the CAB will soon require that actual
notice of boarding priority rules and check-in deadlines and pro-
cedures be given to each passenger. Such notice will probably take
the form of enclosures in ticket envelopes and signs posted at
ticket counters, methods of notice identical to that required of
carriers' overbooking practices. '
ER-1050's requirement that carriers solicit volunteers before
involuntarily bumping any passenger is perhaps the most striking
evidence of a change in CAB policy regarding oversales. This re-
quirement marks the first time the CAB has directly imposed a
new boarding procedure upon carriers and constitutes a major
interference with the previously flexible reservation system. Be-
cause the CAB has demonstrated a willingness to regulate to the
extent necessary to solve the oversales problem, the effectiveness
of ER-1050 in controlling oversales and reducing involuntary
bumping may determine whether the CAB feels compelled to
97 CAB ER-1050, supra note 3, at 24,284 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R.
250.11).
91 CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,279.
"CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,281; ACAP's Comments
on CAB EDR-334, supra note 76.
100 CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,281; CAB Order No.
78-9-6 (August 17, 1978).
101 See CAB Order No. 78-9-6 (August 17, 1978).
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exercise further and more direct controls over carrier reservation
practices.
Given its new policy of attempting to control the causes of
oversales, the CAB was prudent in choosing economic incentives
as opposed to direct regulation of reservation practices. Direct
regulation would be inappropriate because as yet the CAB has
not determined the extent to which any single reservation practice
causes oversales. When the CAB instituted its reexamination of
the oversales problem in 1976, it requested data from the carriers
to determine the relationship between reservation practices and
oversales. At that time, it deemed some quantification of the rela-
tionship essential to sound regulatory policy.' The CAB, however,
suspended this request prior to promulgating ER-1050 because of
the burden of accumulating the necessary data."n Thus no precise
knowledge concerning the magnitude of oversales occasioned by
each of the known causative factors currently exists. For example,
many assume that overbooking is the major cause of oversales.1'"
Estimates of the percentage of oversales caused by overbooking,
however, range from 15 percent to 65 percent.'" Thus it is not
certain that reducing or eliminating overbooking would have an
appreciable impact on the number of oversales.
Even if one or more reservation practices could be identified as
the major causes of industry-wide oversales, an industry-wide uni-
form imposition of controls over reservation practices may not be
efficacious because the primary causes of oversales can vary from
carrier to carrier. While great reliance upon "free sale" arrange-
ments or "block ticketing" programs by one carrier may be a chief
cause of oversales, an inefficiently managed overbooking program
may be the chief cause of another carrer's oversales. Assuming
the accuracy of CAB estimates that human and computer error
may be responsible for more than 50 percent of industry-wide over-
sales," creation of economic incentives to upgrade the quality of
102 CAB EDR-296, supra note 7, at 16,479.
103 CAB EDR-334, supra note 4, at 48,579.
104 Comments on CAB EDR-296 by the Aviation Consumer Action Project,
submitted to the CAB on October 15, 1976, at 13. These comments are on file
with the CAB in Washington, D.C. [hereinafter cited as ACAP's Comments on
EDR-296].
10 CAB EDR-334, supra note 4, at 48,582.
1 ld., at 48,583.
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carrier operations may be the only viable regulatory alternative.
An alternative method for controlling oversales has been sug-
gested by Northwest Airlines and Allegheny Airlines. They pro-
pose that the CAB set a minimum standard of performance for
the industry and initiate enforcement actions against carriers whose
rates of oversales exceed that standard.' 7 The basis of such a pro-
posal is statistical evidence that the general increase in the rate
of oversales is attributable only to a few carriers. ' For example,
in 1976 the domestic industry-wide rate of oversales was 7.0 pas-
sengers per 10,000 persons enplaned, yet Northwest's was 2.3 and
Allegheny's was 4.4. In contrast, Aloha Airlines and Hawaiian
Airlines had a combined average rate of 47.5.'" Statistics indicate
that nine carriers carrying one-third of domestic air travelers were
responsible for 57 percent of all oversales in 1976. ' The CAB has
not responded publicly to this proposal. Whether it will be seriously
considered by the CAB along with the possibility of more direct
controls over carriers' reservation practices depends upon the effec-
tiveness of ER-1050 as a regulatory solution to the oversales
problem.
The effectiveness of ER-1050 will depend largely upon whether
increased amounts of denied boarding compensation and expanded
eligibility for such compensation will create an additional economic
incentive of sufficient magnitude to persuade carriers to control
the causes of oversales. Assuming that the number of bumped
passengers remained constant, the total amount of compensation
payable by the airline industry would certainly increase under
ER-1050. The CAB estimates that approximately 50 percent of
all bumped passengers were ineligible for any compensation be-
cause of the alternative transportation exception contained in the
1967 regulations."' Because these passengers are now eligible for
"
7 Comments on CAB EDR-334 made by Northwest Airlines, Inc., submitted
to the CAB on November 16, 1977, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Northwest's Com-
ments]; Comments on EDR-334 made by Allegheny Airlines, Inc., submitted to
the CAB on November 22, 1977, at 5 [hereinafter cited as Allegheny's Com-
ments]. These comments are on file with the CAB in Washington, D.C.
10 Northwest's Comments, supra note 107, at 2; Allegheny's Comments, supra
note 107, at 2.
0 Northwest's Comments, supra note 107, at 2.
"O Northwest's Comments, supra note 107, at 5.
"' CAB Comments of ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,280.
COMMENTS
one-half the compensation otherwise payable under ER-1050 and
passengers outside of the exception are now eligible for twice the
percentage rate of compensation payable under the superseded
regulations, total compensation payable could increase by at least
200 percent.
It is impossible, however, to estimate the magnitude of the addi-
tional economic incentive created by ER-1050 for two reasons.
First, the definition of ticket value has been greatly expanded and
is not presently quantifiable. Since compensation payable to a
bumped passenger is based upon a fixed percentage rate of the
ticket value, it is not possible to determine the total compensation
payable by the airline industry. Second, the CAB accumulated no
data on the amounts of denied boarding compensation actually
paid to bumped passengers by airlines under the 1967 regulation.
Consequently, there is no way to estimate the significance of the
increases in the percentage rate of compensation payable under
ER-1050 by ignoring the expanded definition of ticket value and
using the average yearly payment of denied boarding compensa-
tion to bumped passengers as a basis of calculation.
ER-1050 does require each carrier to report how much compen-
sation is paid to passengers who are bumped. It will therefore be
possible for the CAB to ascertain the economic impact of the new
regulations upon the airline industry. The foregoing analysis indi-
cates, however, that the CAB may have had little basis when it
promulgated the new regulations for concluding that ER-1050
would create an additional economic incentive of sufficient magni-
tude to induce carriers to control the causes of oversales. It seems
imperative that the CAB monitor the situation closely in the
months ahead to determine the economic impact of ER-1050.
Without additional data, there is no basis for concluding that
sufficient economic incentive has been created by ER-1050 to
compel airlines to control the causes of oversales.
The requirement of ER-1050 that carriers solicit volunteers be-
fore bumping a passenger against his will may create temporary
problems for carriers. In most cases, carriers do not discover that
a flight has been oversold until just prior to its scheduled depar-
ture time.1" Thus solicitation of volunteers at the boarding gate
1'Ozark's Comments, supra note 15, at 17; Allegheny's Comments, supra
note 107.
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would normally delay the flight's departure. ' Under a conditional
reservation system, however, volunteers may be obtained well in
advance of departure time. Passengers under such a system are
offered lower fares when they make their reservations if they con-
sent to being bumped in the event of an oversale. " For example,
Eastern Airlines offers such passengers a refund and free passage
on the next available flight if they are bumped." ' Even if an air-
line chooses to solicit volunteers at the boarding gate, establish-
ment of earlier check-in deadlines would eliminate the possibility
that solicitation of volunteers would delay a flight's departure at
its scheduled time. Any difficulties in implementing the program
would therefore appear to be solvable. The CAB obviously reached
this conclusion during the rulemaking proceeding."
Of greater significance is the possibility that the volunteer pro-
gram may prove unworkable in the long run. ER-1050 sets high
levels of compensation for passengers that are bumped involun-
tarily, but it allows carriers to determine what level of compensa-
tion they will pay volunteers. This was done on the assumption
that volunteers could be obtained by payment of relatively small
amounts of compensation, giving carriers an incentive to make a
genuine effort to solicit volunteers. As passengers become more
familiar with their options under the new regulations, however,
they may decline to volunteer because of the higher rate of com-
pensation payable to passengers bumped involuntarily. For ex-
ample, conditional reservations might then become unattractive to
passengers who might otherwise use them. In that event, airlines
would be forced to raise compensation for volunteers to a higher
level than for passengers who are bumped involuntarily. The CAB
has acknowledged the possibility that this might occur and appar-
ently believes such an eventuality would not be fatal to the success
of the volunteer program.'1 Without an economic incentive, how-
1'" This is precisely the objection to soliciting volunteers which was raised
by carriers in the rulemaking proceeding. Ozark's Comments, supra note 15,
at 18; Allegheny's Comments, supra note 107, at 5-6.
"
4 ACAP's Comments on EDR-296, supra note 104, at 14; CAB EDR-296,
supra note 7.
1' Eastern's Comments, supra note 71, at 1.
11' CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,279.
117 Id.
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ever, it seems doubtful that any carrier would make the effort
necessary to obtain an optimal number of volunteers.
Public disclosure of information concerning oversales may pose
additional problems for carriers. ER-1050 requires that each pas-
senger be given actual notice of airline overbooking practices, the
possibility of an oversale, the volunteer solicitation program, and
the availability of copies of each carrier's boarding priority rules
and the CAB rules requiring the payment of compensation to
passengers bumped involuntarily." ' Both the CAB and commenta-
tors have noted that disclosure of such information could encourage
travelers to book multiple reservations to protect themselves against
the prospect of being bumped.11 ER-1050's disclosure require-
ments may create an unfortunate impression in the public mind
of a higher possibility of being bumped than is actually the case.
If this situation develops, "no shows" and "reservation turnover"
will increase. This may necessitate increased reliance by the carriers
on overbooking, which could result in increased oversales. At the
present time, there is no available data from which to evaluate the
likelihood of this occurrence.
Aside from questions concerning its workability and effective-
ness, ER-1050 has raised important issues of international law.
The CAB gave its new oversales regulations extraterritorial appli-
cation in order to give protection to U.S. travelers abroad. Thus
ER-1050 covers all passengers with confirmed reservation space
verified in the United States traveling on any flight originating or
terminating or serving any point in the United States. '
A number of foreign carriers, however, have not filed tariff rules
1 CAB ER-1050, supra note 3, at 24,284-85 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. 5
250.11).
119 CAB EDR-109, supra note 30, at 461; ACAP's Comments on EDR-296,
supra note 104.
120 CAB Comments on ER-1050, supra note 6, at 24,281. When 14 C.F.R.
Part 250 was adopted in 1967, it applied only to United States flag carriers. In
1974, it was extended to foreign air carriers. CAB EDR-334, supra note 4, at
48,582. United States oversales regulations were then made applicable to any
flight originating or terminating or serving any point in the United States. Portions
of flights originating or terminating in the United States which occurred wholly
outside the United States were excluded. Only passengers with confirmed reserva-
tion space verified in the United States were protected. 14 C.F.R. § 250.2 (1978).
The CAB chose to retain these provisions and to give ER-1050 the same extra-
territorial application as the superceded regulations. CAB Comments on ER-1050,
supra note 6, at 24,281.
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required by ER-1050.' They contend that U.S. oversales regula-
tions should not apply to flights departing foreign countries for the
United States because oversales are subject only to the laws of
the country in which they occur."' Foreign governments also have
objected to the extraterritorial application of ER-1050 and have
registered complaints with the Department of State. They contend
that the CAB has no authority to impose regulations unilaterally
upon activities in foreign nations and that such action may only
be taken pursuant to bilateral agreement. ' Moreover, carriers and
foreign governments contend that ER-1050 alters existing bilateral
agreements. Great Britain, for example, argues that Bermuda II
prohibits the CAB from requiring British carriers to file any par-
ticular form of tariff."
In response to these developments, the CAB has adopted a new
rule that applies to all carriers engaged in foreign transportation
which have failed to comply with ER-1050.2 " This rule requires
such carriers to give actual notice in any advertisement circulated
in the United States that they do not comply with U.S. Government
rules on oversold flights. Carriers are also required to include this
notice in each ticket sold by it or its agents in the United States."'
The CAB stands firm on the validity of the new rule. It asserts
that any sovereign state has the authority to regulate the adver-
tising and sales practices taking place within its borders to insure
adequate protection for its citizens, regardless of any bilateral
agreement. Therefore, it unilaterally may require foreign carriers
121 Part 250-Oversales Advertizing Disclosure of Noncompliance With Over-
sales Rules, CAB ER-1078, 43 Fed. Reg. 50,164, 50,165 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as CAB ER-1078].
"IfId.; See Comments of Aeromexico on CAB EDR-334, submitted to the
CAB on November 22, 1977, at 2. Comments of Compania Mexicana De Avia-
cion, S.A. (Mexicana) on CAB EDR-334, submitted to the CAB on November
22, 1977. These comments are on file with the CAB in Washington, D.C.
12 CAB ER-1078, supra note 121, at 50,165. Many foreign carriers urge the
CAB to waive extraterritorial application to facilitate the negotiation of inter-
nationally uniform oversales regulations. Comments of certain members of the
International Air Transport Association on CAB EDR-334, submitted to the
CAB on November 21, 1977, at 8. These comments are on file with the CAB in
Washington, D.C.
" CAB ER-1078, supra note 121, at 50,165.




doing business in the United States market to conform to its
domestic laws."2 '
The repercussions of this recent action taken by the CAB with
regard to ER-1050 are as yet uncertain. The CAB undoubtedly
has the power to regulate the sales and advertising practices of
foreign carriers within the United States. Thus the CAB can at-
tempt to compel foreign carriers to fully comply with the require-
ments of ER 1050. Public disclosure of a foreign carrier's failure
to comply with CAB regulations could result in a substantial loss
of revenue to that carrier if a sizable number of U.S. passengers
choose to travel abroad with airlines that adhere to the CAB's
new oversales regulations. These foreign carriers may, however,
continue to refuse to comply with ER-1050. Foreign governments
may seek instead to protect their airlines from the prospect of
economic loss by taking retaliatory action affecting flights of U.S.
carriers entering their territory. Future developments will reveal
whether foreign carriers eventually choose to comply with ER-1050
or attempt to take retaliatory action through their respective gov-
ernments.
CONCLUSION
Past experience and the various proposals submitted by the
industry and the CAB suggest that, short of direct controls over
airline reservation practices, the problem of oversales cannot be
eliminated. Because the CAB has a continuing commitment to a
reservation system which allows for as much flexibility as possible
in the making and altering of reservations, a policy decision was
made in ER-1050 to preserve this flexibility while at the same time
making clear that reductions in oversales must be effected. Whether
the provisions of ER-1050 will be successful in reducing oversales
to an acceptable level remains to be seen. The CAB, however, has
made explicit its intention to reduce the flexibility inherent in cur-
rent reservation practices should this prove necessary to reduce
oversales.
""CAB ER-1078, supra note 121, at 50,165.
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